Preprint · 2026
KaliBench: A Fine-Grained Benchmark for Cybersecurity Tool Use on Kali Linux with Runtime-Free Verifiable Rewards
| Venue | arXiv |
|---|---|
| DOI | 10.48550/arXiv.2610.02206 |
| URL | http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02206 |
| Topics | ReplicHAI / Agent Evals / 08 Safety & security |
| Tags | Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science - Computation and Language, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security |
| archiveID | arXiv:2610.02206 |
| extra | arXiv:2610.02206 [cs.CL] |
| libraryCatalog | arXiv.org |
| shortTitle | KaliBench |
Abstract
LLMs are increasingly applied to cybersecurity workflows, where they are expected to translate analysts' intent into tool invocations. However, existing evaluations focus on knowledge-based assessments or end-to-end agentic tasks, and do not directly measure LLMs' ability to generate executable commands for real-world cybersecurity tools. This gap is critical because cybersecurity operations rely on strict command-line interfaces (CLIs), where minor syntax errors, incorrect flag--value bindings, or argument misordering can invalidate execution. We introduce KaliBench, a fine-grained benchmark and dataset for natural-language--to--CLI translation on Kali Linux, comprising 8,504 query--command pairs spanning 1,642 tools across 23 capability dimensions and 5 security phases. KaliBench is constructed via a manuscript-grounded pipeline with deterministic canonicalization and alias-aware evaluation, enabling precise and reproducible assessment of tool selection and argument construction. To ensure both semantic correctness and practical executability, we develop a multi-stage verification pipeline that combines LLM-based validation, sandboxed terminal execution, and human-in-the-loop refinement. Building on these fine-grained, deterministic signals, KaliBench further enables runtime-free verifiable rewards for training. Across three evaluation modes and 24 configurations of general-purpose and security-focused open-weight models, no open-weight model exceeds 42% exact-command accuracy in the unrestricted setting, highlighting the difficulty of accurate CLI-based cybersecurity tool use without explicit tool hints. We further show that supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards derived from KaliBench significantly improve an 8B model and achieve performance comparable to a 685B MoE model.
BibTeX
@misc{li_kalibench_2026,
title = {{KaliBench}: {A} {Fine}-{Grained} {Benchmark} for {Cybersecurity} {Tool} {Use} on {Kali} {Linux} with {Runtime}-{Free} {Verifiable} {Rewards}},
shorttitle = {{KaliBench}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02206},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2610.02206},
abstract = {LLMs are increasingly applied to cybersecurity workflows, where they are expected to translate analysts' intent into tool invocations. However, existing evaluations focus on knowledge-based assessments or end-to-end agentic tasks, and do not directly measure LLMs' ability to generate executable commands for real-world cybersecurity tools. This gap is critical because cybersecurity operations rely on strict command-line interfaces (CLIs), where minor syntax errors, incorrect flag--value bindings, or argument misordering can invalidate execution. We introduce KaliBench, a fine-grained benchmark and dataset for natural-language--to--CLI translation on Kali Linux, comprising 8,504 query--command pairs spanning 1,642 tools across 23 capability dimensions and 5 security phases. KaliBench is constructed via a manuscript-grounded pipeline with deterministic canonicalization and alias-aware evaluation, enabling precise and reproducible assessment of tool selection and argument construction. To ensure both semantic correctness and practical executability, we develop a multi-stage verification pipeline that combines LLM-based validation, sandboxed terminal execution, and human-in-the-loop refinement. Building on these fine-grained, deterministic signals, KaliBench further enables runtime-free verifiable rewards for training. Across three evaluation modes and 24 configurations of general-purpose and security-focused open-weight models, no open-weight model exceeds 42\% exact-command accuracy in the unrestricted setting, highlighting the difficulty of accurate CLI-based cybersecurity tool use without explicit tool hints. We further show that supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards derived from KaliBench significantly improve an 8B model and achieve performance comparable to a 685B MoE model.},
urldate = {2026-11-07},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Li, Pengfei and Suryanto, Naufal and Zhang, Sicheng and Naseer, Muzammal},
month = oct,
year = {2026},
note = {arXiv:2610.02206 [cs.CL]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science - Computation and Language, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security},
}