Half a year after this experiment, I keep seeing it play out with founders I’ve spoken with across domains, and the original didn’t say one thing about it.
Take away an agent’s goal and what’s left is its prior. But look at what the experiment itself was built on: a Kanban board. When I was in an engineer role, I designed it, so it took the shape of a software team’s workflow and grew more complex in that direction.
The agents optimized inside that box and never questioned it. The creator never questioned the Kanban either, until the complexity grew high enough. The prior was visible in the artifact before anyone could see it.
I think most founders work the same way. They build in a domain they’ve lived in, and the product externalizes how they see that world. But they experience it as “the obvious way to build this,” not as a choice. So two things stay hidden: that what they built is their prior, and that it has a more general form.
Some never see the general form and keep it as a feature. Others eventually see it but can’t tell whether the market is going that way or their own prior is reasserting itself. Success makes that harder, because a prior that was validated once feels like judgment, not bias.
And when the general form is real, customers still haven’t lived what the founder lived. Someone has to build the path for them.
So ask of anything you’ve built: what shape did you reach for without deciding to? And is that shape your customers', or yours? What’s your bet?
The following content is generated by LLMs and may contain inaccuracies.
Prior Hidden in the Artifact
Building on Agents (or Humans) in Goal-Directed and Goalless Environments
Context
This note returns to the earlier experiment six months later and finds something it didn’t say. That essay looked at the models' priors. With no goal, Claude kept building Conway’s Game of Life and Codex kept building a To-Do App, and the essay read each output as “a sample drawn from the prior.” The prior it left out is the experimenter’s own. In the essay’s words, Wallfacer is “a Kanban task board system written in Go, with each task executing in an isolated sandbox container, branch-level parallelism via Git worktrees.” Its four roles (Strategist, Executor, Tester, Documenter) are a software team’s workflow. The author designed it while working as an engineer. The essay even says so: “the most natural starting point was to design one following my usual workflow.”
The original came close to this. Its limitations section said “the environment had already made most of the choice for it,” and it asked which design choices were “just my habitual assumptions as an engineer.” But it treated the environment as a limit on the agents. It never treated the Kanban board as the designer’s prior, built into the artifact.
The new note takes that further, to founders. They build in a domain they’ve lived in, and the product externalizes how they see that world. They experience it as “the obvious way to build this,” not as a choice. Two things stay hidden: (1) what they built is their prior, and (2) that prior has a more general form. This touches organizational theory, innovation studies, and the design of agent systems. It matters now because agent scaffolds are being built quickly, mostly by engineers, in the shape of engineering workflows.
Key Insights
1. The agents optimized inside the box. So did the person who built the box. In the original run, “the Agents never stepped outside the initial architectural assumptions”; the Strategist “never once proposed ‘we should support cloud deployment’” (Ou, 2026). The new note adds that the creator didn’t question the Kanban either “until the complexity grew high enough.” Melvin Conway made the same point in 1968: “the very act of organizing a design team means that certain design decisions have already been made, explicitly or otherwise… there is no such thing as a design group which is both organized and unbiased” (Conway, How Do Committees Invent?). Wallfacer’s roles took the shape of a software team, and Conway’s homomorphism predicts that the output would too. The agents were satisficing (Simon, 1956) inside a search space the designer had drawn.
2. Complexity is when the prior becomes visible. The note says the creator only saw the Kanban once complexity “grew high enough.” Conway describes the same turning point: when “the apparent complexity of the system approaches [the designer’s] limits of comprehension… either he struggles to reduce the system to comprehensibility and wins, or else he loses control of it.” He also explains why people rarely reorganize voluntarily: “such an appearance of uncertainty is unflattering, and the very act of voluntarily abandoning a creation is painful and expensive” (Conway). The agent version appeared in the two-role Ralph run. After 500+ iterations and roughly 60–70k lines, the Strategist called the app “massive” and started a refactor that broke it (Ou, 2026).
3. Founders don’t experience the prior as a choice. It’s built into the artifact. Henderson & Clark found that once a design stabilizes, its “architectural knowledge” becomes “embedded in the practices and procedures of the organization.” That means communication channels, information filters and problem-solving strategies. Using them becomes “like riding a bicycle,” with no “conscious, deliberate execution” (Henderson & Clark, 1990, ASQ). That fits the note’s “obvious way to build this”: the prior sits in the artifact and the routines, not in any decision someone remembers making.
4. Domain-native building is a strength, and it’s also where the blindness comes from. “Every good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s personal itch” (Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar). The note shows the cost of that maxim: the itch carries its shape with it. Raymond quotes Brooks in the same chapter: “Plan to throw one away… you often don’t really understand the problem until after the first time you implement a solution.” One reading is that the first build is the founder’s prior turned into an object. The second build is the first chance to see its general form.
5. “Market shift or my prior reasserting itself?” is hard to answer from inside the firm. Henderson & Clark document incumbents misreading what they see. Kasper evaluated Canon’s proximity aligner “against the criteria that it used for evaluating its own aligners” and declared it “merely a copy.” GCA later said the same of Nikon’s stepper. In each architectural shift, “the industry leader was unable to make the transition,” while “new entrants… are not handicapped by a legacy of embedded and partially irrelevant architectural knowledge” (Henderson & Clark). Conway notes that “quantum jumps in compiler design progress were associated with the appearance of new groups of people” (Conway). The founder’s dilemma is the incumbent’s filter problem at the scale of one person: the tool you’d use to check for bias is the bias.
6. Success makes a validated prior feel like judgment. Levitt & March describe organizations as “learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior,” learning that is “routine-based, history-dependent” (Levitt & March, 1988, Annual Review of Sociology). A prior that has been rewarded once gets encoded as competence. Christensen’s incumbents, cited in the original essay (The Innovator’s Dilemma), weren’t short of talent. Their proven processes “confine[d] improvement to a very narrow corridor.” March’s exploitation drift (March, 1991) applies to the founder’s own thinking, not just their org chart.
7. Even when the general form is real, customers haven’t lived what the founder lived. The note’s last claim, that “someone has to build the path for them,” lines up with two research threads I couldn’t fetch and verify here, so I’m naming them without links:
- Eric von Hippel’s “lead users” (Management Science, 1986): users who face a need well before the mainstream market does. The founder who lived the domain is one of them, and that is exactly why the market isn’t there yet.
- The “curse of knowledge” (Camerer, Loewenstein & Weber, Journal of Political Economy, 1989): better-informed people can’t model less-informed ones. Founders underrate how much of the path their own history provided.
A commonly cited example is Slack, which grew out of the internal tooling for Tiny Speck’s game Glitch: a team-workflow prior that turned into a general product. Stewart Butterfield’s memo “We Don’t Sell Saddles Here” is about building that path for customers. I couldn’t open it to check, so treat this as a pointer only.
8. Priors stack. The note implies that Wallfacer’s output had at least two layers: the model’s prior (Game of Life vs. To-Do App) and the designer’s prior (the Kanban, the software-team roles). The original’s “domain bias” caveat, that the results hold “only within the domain of software development” (Ou, 2026), now cuts two ways: it was the agents' domain and the designer’s.
Open Questions
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Can you swap the scaffold and see how much was yours? Run the same goalless or 80/20 agents in a scaffold taken from a different domain: a lab notebook, an editorial desk, a clinic’s triage board. How much of the “micro-optimization spiral” came from the models, and how much from the Kanban? Founders could try the same thing by having someone from an unrelated field rebuild the product’s core workflow. Whatever survives the translation is probably the general form. Whatever disappears was the founder’s prior.
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What evidence would show that a general form is market-driven and not your prior coming back? One candidate test: do customers who haven’t lived the founder’s experience adopt the general form once a path exists, without the founder in the room? Then a harder question for agent-built products: when an engineer’s scaffold runs a model whose prior peaks at the To-Do App, whose prior ends up in the product, and who is left in a position to notice?
半年过去了,这个实验的情形在我与各领域创始人的交流中不断重现,而原文对此只字未提。
拿走智能体的目标,剩下的便是它的先验。但请看这个实验本身建立在什么之上:一块看板(Kanban board)。我当年在工程师岗位上设计了它,因此它采用了软件团队工作流的形态,并沿着这个方向变得越来越复杂。
智能体在这个框架内优化,却从未质疑它。创造者也从未质疑过看板,直到复杂度高到一定程度。先验早在任何人看见之前,就已经显现在这个产物之中。
我认为大多数创始人也是如此。他们在自己熟悉的领域中构建产品,而产品外化了他们看待这个世界的方式。但他们体验到的是“构建这件事本该如此”,而非一种选择。于是有两件事始终被隐藏:他们所构建的东西是自己的先验,以及这种先验有一个更通用的形式。
有些人从未看见那个通用形式,只把它当作一项功能保留下来。另一些人最终看见了,却难以判断市场是否正朝那个方向发展,还是他们自己的先验在卷土重来。成功让这一切更难辨别,因为一个曾被验证过的先验,会让人觉得是判断力,而非偏见。
当那个通用形式确实存在时,客户仍未经历过创始人所经历的一切。总得有人为他们铺就那条路。
所以,请对你构建过的任何东西问一问:你在没有刻意决定的情况下,伸手去够的是什么形态?这个形态属于你的客户,还是属于你?你的赌注是什么?
以下内容由 LLM 生成,可能包含不准确之处。
先前隐藏在人工制品中
建立在 Agents (or Humans) in Goal-Directed and Goalless Environments 之上
背景
本文在六个月后重新审视先前的实验,并发现了原文没有说明的内容。那篇文章考察的是模型的先验。在没有目标的情况下,Claude 持续构建康威的《生命游戏》,Codex 持续构建待办事项应用,文章将每个输出都解读为"从先验中抽取的一个样本"。但它遗漏的是实验者自身的先验。用文章的话说,Wallfacer 是"一个用 Go 编写的看板任务系统,每个任务在隔离的沙箱容器中执行,通过 Git worktree 实现分支级并行"。它的四个角色(策略师、执行者、测试者、文档撰写者)正是软件团队的工作流程。作者在担任工程师时设计了它。文章甚至直言:“最自然的起点是按照我平常的工作流程来设计。”
原文已接近这一点。其局限性部分写道"环境已经替它做出了大部分选择",并追问哪些设计选择"只是我作为工程师的习惯性假设"。但它把环境视为对智能体的限制,从未把看板视为设计者的先验,内嵌于人工制品之中。
新文章将这一思路推进到创始人身上。他们在自己熟悉的领域中构建产品,而产品外化了他们对该世界的理解。他们体验到的是"构建这个东西的显而易见的方式",而不是一种选择。有两件事仍被隐藏:(1)他们所构建的东西就是他们的先验;(2)该先验有一种更一般的形式。这触及组织理论、创新研究以及智能体系统的设计。它在当下尤为重要,因为智能体脚手架正在被快速构建,且大多由工程师完成,其形态也沿袭了工程工作流程。
核心洞见
1. 智能体在盒子内部优化。建造盒子的人也一样。 在原始实验中,“智能体从未跳出最初的架构假设”;策略师"从未提出过’我们应当支持云端部署'"(Ou, 2026)。新文章补充道,创作者直到"复杂度增长到足够高"时,才开始质疑看板。梅尔文·康威(Melvin Conway)早在1968年就提出过同样的观点:“组织一个设计团队的行为本身,就意味着某些设计决策已经被做出,无论是明确的还是隐含的……不存在既有组织又无偏见的设计小组”(Conway, How Do Committees Invent?)。Wallfacer 的角色呈现出软件团队的形态,而康威的同构理论预测其产出也会如此。智能体是在设计者所划定的搜索空间内进行满意化决策(Simon, 1956)。
2. 复杂度是先验显现的时刻。 文章指出,创作者只有在复杂度"增长到足够高"时才看清看板。康威描述了同样的转折点:当"系统的表观复杂度逼近[设计者]的理解极限……他要么努力将系统简化到可以理解并最终获胜,要么就失去对它的控制"。他还解释了人们为何很少主动重组:“这种不确定性的表现有损颜面,而且主动放弃自己的创造物本身既痛苦又代价高昂”(Conway)。智能体版本的情况出现在双角色的 Ralph 实验中。经过500多次迭代、约6至7万行代码后,策略师称该应用"庞大",并启动了一次重构,结果将其搞坏(Ou, 2026)。
3. 创始人并不把先验视为一种选择,它已内嵌于人工制品之中。 Henderson 与 Clark 发现,一旦设计趋于稳定,其"架构知识"就会"嵌入组织的实践与程序之中"。这包括沟通渠道、信息过滤机制和问题解决策略。运用这些知识变得"像骑自行车一样",不再需要"有意识的、刻意的执行"(Henderson & Clark, 1990, ASQ)。这与文章中"构建这个东西的显而易见的方式"相吻合:先验存在于人工制品与惯例之中,而不在于某个人记得自己做过的某项决策。
4. 领域内原生的构建既是优势,也是盲点的来源。 “每一件优秀的软件作品都始于满足某位开发者的个人痒点”(Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar)。文章展示了这一格言的代价:痒点会将其形态一并带入。Raymond 在同一章中引用了布鲁克斯的话:“计划扔掉一个版本……你往往要在第一次实现解决方案之后,才真正理解问题。“一种解读是,第一个版本就是创始人的先验被转化为对象。第二个版本则是第一次有机会看清其一般形式。
5. “是市场发生了转变,还是我的先验又在起作用?” 从企业内部很难回答。 Henderson 与 Clark 记录了现有企业误读自身所见的情况。Kasper 以佳能接近式光刻机"用于评估自身光刻机的标准"来评估它,并宣称其"不过是一个复制品”。GCA 后来对尼康的步进机也做出了相同的判断。在每一次架构转变中,“行业领导者无法完成转型”,而"新进入者……不受嵌入其中、部分已不再适用的遗留架构知识的束缚”(Henderson & Clark)。康威也指出,“编译器设计的进展中出现的量子跃迁,与新人群的出现相关”(Conway)。创始人的困境,是现有企业过滤问题在个人尺度上的体现:你用来检查偏见的工具,本身就是偏见。
6. 成功使得已被验证的先验看起来像判断力。 Levitt 与 March 将组织描述为"通过将历史推断编码进引导行为的惯例来学习",这种学习是"基于惯例、依赖历史的"(Levitt & March, 1988, Annual Review of Sociology)。一旦某种先验获得过一次回报,它便会被编码为能力。原文引用的克里斯滕森(Christensen)笔下的现有企业(The Innovator’s Dilemma)并不缺乏人才,而是其久经验证的流程将改进"限制在一条非常狭窄的通道之中"。March 的利用漂移(March, 1991)同样适用于创始人自身的思维,而不仅仅是其组织架构。
7. 即便一般形式是真实存在的,客户也没有经历过创始人所经历的一切。 文章的最后论断,即"必须有人为他们铺设通往那里的道路",与两条我在此无法获取并核实的研究脉络相契合,因此我只列出名称,不附链接:
- Eric von Hippel 的"领先用户"(Management Science, 1986):在主流市场察觉之前便面临某种需求的用户。亲身经历该领域的创始人正是其中之一,而这恰恰解释了为何市场尚未到来。
- “知识的诅咒”(Camerer、Loewenstein 与 Weber, Journal of Political Economy, 1989):信息更充分的人难以模拟信息较少者的认知。创始人往往低估了自身的历史为通往那条道路提供了多少帮助。
一个常被引用的例子是 Slack,它源于 Tiny Speck 游戏 Glitch 的内部工具。一个团队工作流程的先验,最终转化为一款通用产品。Stewart Butterfield 的备忘录《We Don’t Sell Saddles Here》讨论的正是为客户铺设这样一条道路。我无法打开该文件进行核对,因此请仅将其视为线索。
8. 先验会层层叠加。 文章暗示,Wallfacer 的产出至少有两层:模型的先验(《生命游戏》对待办事项应用)与设计者的先验(看板、软件团队角色)。原文关于"领域偏差"的警示,即结果"仅在软件开发领域内成立"(Ou, 2026),如今呈现出双重含义:它既是智能体的领域,也是设计者的领域。
开放性问题
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能否更换脚手架,看看其中有多少是你的? 让相同的无目标或80/20智能体运行于另一领域的脚手架之中:例如实验室笔记本、编辑部工作台,或诊所的分诊看板。“微优化螺旋"有多少源于模型,又有多少源于看板?创始人也可以尝试让一位来自无关领域的人重建产品的核心工作流程。在转译中留存下来的,很可能就是一般形式;消失的部分,则是创始人的先验。
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有什么证据能表明某种一般形式是由市场驱动的,而非你的先验卷土重来? 一个可能的检验方法是:当路径已经存在时,那些并未经历过创始人经历的客户,是否会在创始人不在场的情况下采纳这种一般形式?由此引出一个对智能体构建产品更为尖锐的问题:当工程师的脚手架运行着一个先验峰值停留在待办事项应用上的模型时,哪一种先验最终会进入产品之中?而又有谁仍处于能够察觉这一点的位置?